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The UK government has embarked on an ambitious programme to reform the 
English and Welsh probation sector. Key to these reforms has been ‘marketisation’ 
involving Payment by Results. More recently the devolution of justice has become a 
key theme. This paper describes key reforms that have taken place since 2010 and 
sets out evidence for their effectiveness. Currently, the available evidence is limited, 
but more evidence is available from other sectors where similar models have also 
been used. This evidence base is discussed with particular reference to the potential 
for the reforms to promote innovation. 
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Introduction: Transforming Rehabilitation 
Rates of re-offending for offenders under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Justice 
System in England and Wales are relatively high and have been for a number of 
years. Recent figures from the Ministry of Justice (2016) relating to the period April 
2013 – March 2014 show that adult offenders starting a court order had a proven 
re-offending rate of 34.0 percent (a slight increase of 0.1 percentage points 
compared to the previous 12 months) and adults released from custody had a 
proven re-offending rate of 45.8 percent (an increase of 0.7 percentage points 
compared to the previous 12 months). The rate for those released from a short 
prison sentence of less than 12 months was 59.8 percent.  
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Faced with a similar picture in 2010, the intention of the previous Coalition 
Government (2010 – 2015) as set out in it’s Coalition Agreement was as follows: 
“We will introduce a ‘rehabilitation revolution’ that will pay independent 
providers to reduce reoffending, paid for by the savings this new approach 
will generate within the criminal justice system.” (HM Government 2010: 23) 
The Coalition Government’s preferred strategy for reducing re-offending while also 
reducing costs was a combination of market testing, commissioning strategies that 
focus on payment by results and a diversification of the supplier base (Bannister et 
al. 2016). The intention was to create a ‘rehabilitation revolution’ with payment by 
results a key driver of change (HM Government 2010). Broadly speaking, this policy 
has continued under the administration of Prime Minister David Cameron (2015 – 
2016) and Prime Minister Theresa May (2016 – present) with one significant 
addition: a stronger focus on justice devolution. 
This paper first describes the evolution of current policy on Transforming 
Rehabilitation. It then describes the use of marketization and payment by results, 
assessing the evidence for their effectiveness. It finishes by discussing the potential 
of such policy levers to deliver innovation in the delivery of criminal justice. 
 
Evolution of the Transforming Rehabilitation policy 
In 2010 probation services in England and Wales were delivered by 35 Probation 
Trusts. Probation Trusts were consistent with a broader trend in public service 
reform under the previous New Labour which saw the creation of numerous ‘arms-
length’ mechanisms for the management of state services, such as Foundation 
Trusts in the health sector and Academy schools in education (Diamond 2013). 
Under the Coalition Government, early ideas on reform of the probation service 
envisaged a number of probation innovation pilot projects subject to payment by 
results and devolution of the commissioning of community offender services to the 
35 Probation Trusts. The aim was to encourage new market entrants from the 
voluntary, private and public sectors as well as joint ventures, social enterprises and 
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Public Service Mutuals (Ministry of Justice 2012). Probation Trusts would continue 
to deliver services to high-risk offenders and could compete to run other services. 
This devolved strategy seemed consistent with the earlier Green Paper on criminal 
justice reform in which the Coalition Government set out an agenda designed to 
challenge a ‘Whitehall knows best’ approach, which was viewed as having stifled 
innovation at national and local levels (Ministry of Justice 2010). The Green Paper 
made repeated references to innovation encompassing the opportunities that 
reform would provide for criminal justice “frontline professionals” to innovate in 
their work with offenders (Ministry of Justice 2010: 11) and also the opportunities 
for a wide range of organisations to innovate within a mixed economy. Innovation 
seemed to include contributions from social entrepreneurs in local communities: 
“Rather than operating under close central control, we want to unlock the 
professionalism, innovation and passion of experts from all walks of life who 
want to make their streets safer and their towns and cities better places in 
which to live.”  (Ministry of Justice, 2010: 9) 
 
However, a change of Secretary of State midway through the Coalition Government 
resulted in these approaches being discontinued (Bannister et al. 2016) as the more 
radical Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) strategy was advanced (Ministry of Justice, 
2013a and b). The Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform (Ministry of 
Justice 2013b) reiterated the Ministry of Justice’s intention to introduce a 
widespread programme of competition for probation services. The Probation Trusts 
would be abolished and the majority of community-based offender services 
(community sentences and licenses) would be subject to competition. In a reversal 
of the earlier emphasis, there would be a national competition for geographical 
‘bundles’ of resettlement services in the form of Community Rehabilitation 
Companies (CRCs). Contracts for CRCs would include an element of payment by 
results. Existing probation services would be allowed to join the competition by 
setting up new independent entities (such as employee-led mutuals). Work with 
high-risk offenders, assessments and court reports would pass to a new National 
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Probation Service. The split between the National Probation Service and CRCs took 
place in 2014 and contracts were signed with the successful bidders in February 
2015.  
 
Payment by Results 
An important element of reform of probation services has been the use of Payment 
by Results (PbR). Over recent years there has been increasing interest in ‘Payment 
by Results’ (Pay for Success in the US) as a model for commissioning services in the 
public sector. A PbR contract links payment to the outcomes achieved, rather than 
the inputs, outputs or processes of a service (Cabinet Office 2011). The Coalition 
Government committed to “introducing payment by results across public services” 
(Cabinet Office 2011: 9) and has introduced schemes across diverse areas of policy 
including welfare to work, substance misuse, criminal justice, family interventions 
and overseas development. In a thorough review of the current situation in the UK 
the National Audit Office (2015) identified over 50 schemes containing an element 
of PbR and worth a combined total of at least £15 billion. This report was published 
before the contracts for Community Rehabilitation Companies were signed, all of 
which have a PbR element (Ministry of Justice 2013b).  
The Coalition Government articulated various advantages for PbR initiatives. First, it 
was hoped that they would demand less micro-management and so enable greater 
innovation. Freeing up providers to deliver services in different ways, the 
deployment of PbR would both drive down costs and encourage greater innovation 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013b). As part of its strategy to enable PbR commissioning in 
the probation sector, the Coalition Government (Ministry of Justice, 2011) revised 
the national probation standards, significantly relaxing central government 
direction. Later, Section 15 of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 introduced the 
Rehabilitation Activity Requirement (RAR) for Community Orders and Suspended 
Sentence Orders. While the court decides on the length of the RAR and the number 
of days (intensity), the Community Rehabilitation Company determines the most 
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appropriate interventions to deliver. Second, PbR was seen as a way of tackling 
complex social issues (National Audit Office, 2015), and as a mechanism to focus 
attention on preventative measures (Mulgan et al., 2010).  
Third, PbR was seen as a means to transfer risk by making some or all of the 
payment to a service contingent on that service delivering agreed outcomes. Given 
the need to reduce public sector spending, the transference of risk and the 
deferment of payment for services were attractive propositions for the Coalition 
(Fox and Albertson, 2012). Fourth, the PbR model was seen as a way of encouraging 
new market entrants, eliding with the Coalition’s commitment to increase the 
proportion of specific public services delivered by independent providers (both 
private and not-for-profit), harnessing their ‘creativity and expertise’ (Ministry of 
Justice, 2010: 41). Finally, PbR was seen as a model to increase accountability. In its 
White Paper on Open Public Services the government stated that, ‘Open 
commissioning and payment by results are critical to open public services ... 
Payment by results will build yet more accountability into the system – creating a 
direct financial incentive to focus on what works, but also encouraging providers to 
find better ways of delivering services’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: paragraphs 5.4, 5.16.).  
It is too early to know how effective PbR has been as a driver of change in the 
English and Welsh criminal justice system. At the time of writing, because of the lag 
in calculating re-offending rates, re-offending rates for the first year of CRC 
operation were not available. However, a recent National Audit Office (2015) review 
found lack clear evidence that they delivered the potential benefits their supporters 
advocated, and cautioned that without such evidence, “commissioners may be using 
PbR in circumstances to which it is ill-suited, with a consequent negative impact on 
value for money” (National Audit Office, 2015: 8).  
A Social Impact Bond (Pay for Success Bonds in the US) is a class of PbR contract 
where the finance needed to make the contract work is provided not by the service 
provider but by private investment, usually social investors. The Cabinet Office’s 
Centre for Social Impact Bonds reports that there are now 32 Social Impact Bonds 
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across the UK, supporting tens of thousands of beneficiaries in areas including 
criminal justice, youth unemployment, mental health and homelessness1. 
The first SIB was in the criminal justice sector and started at HMP Peterborough (a 
prison) in 2010. The Ministry of Justice signed a contract with Social Finance (2010) 
to attempt to reduce the reoffending of three cohorts of 1,000 adult males who 
would be discharged from HMP Peterborough having served sentences of less than 
12 months in custody. The outcome measure was a binary one of whether offenders 
were reconvicted or not (Disley et al. 2011: iv). Disley et al. (2011) report that 
investors2 raised £5m to fund the rehabilitation work and that they could earn a 
return of up to £8m from the government and the Big Lottery Fund if re-offending 
falls by 10 per cent per cohort, or, if the rate of re-offending for all 3,000 offenders 
falls by at least 7.5 per cent. If a reduction in re-offending beyond 7.5 per cent was 
delivered investors would receive an increasing return capped at 13 per cent over 
an eight year period (Social Finance 2011:3). Conversely, if offending did not fall 
investors would potentially lose all their money. Changes in national criminal justice 
policy led to the HMP Peterborough SIB being curtailed after two cohorts. 
The independent evaluation of the SIB matched 936 offenders released from 
Peterborough (the first cohort) with 9,360 released from other prisons. The analysis 
found an 8.39 percent reduction in reoffending rates within the first cohort, which 
was insufficient to trigger payment for the first cohort (Jolliffe and Hedderman 
2014). Based on this reduction the Ministry of Justice (2014b.: 2) reported: ‘This 
means that the provider is on track to achieve the 7.5% reduction target for the final 
payment based on an aggregate of both cohorts”. However, interim analysis of the 
second cohort has thrown doubt on this prediction. A Ministry of Justice (2015) 
statistical bulletin provides early analysis of the progress of the second cohort. 
Although only convictions within six months of release, rather than the usual 12 
months, are reported, the results are disappointing and cast doubt on whether a 
                                                        
1 https://data.gov.uk/sib_knowledge_box/home [Accessed 14-03-15] 
2  Our reading of Disley et al. (2011) is that they are social investors and none are from the private sector. 
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payment will be made at the end of the second cohort. There was only a 
small reduction in the frequency of reoffending – an average of 84 reconviction 
events per 100 offenders compared to a national rate of 86.  
The wider evidence-base in relation to SIBs is still limited. There are few formal 
evaluations of SIBs to draw on. Much of the literature is either analysis of the 
concept (eg Mulgan 2010, Fox and Albertson 2012) or reviews of the literature, 
sometimes combined with small-scale surveys of stakeholders (eg Ronicle et al. 
2014). In a recent, structured review of the literature on SIBs Tan et al. (2015: 5) 
searched a number of databases but found “little empirical data about SIBs has been 
produced to date.” 
 
Devolution 
While some elements of reform of the probation sector have arguably been 
centralising, other reforms in the English and Welsh criminal justice system have 
been decentralising. Here we discuss two distinct, but related models: Justice 
Reinvestment and Justice Devolution. 
Allen argues that, in general, JR has two key elements. First, it seeks to develop 
measures and policies to “improve the prospects not just of individual cases but of 
particular places” (Allen 2007: 5). Secondly, JR adopts a strategic approach to the 
prevention of offending and re-offending by collecting and analysing data to inform 
commissioning decisions (ibid.). The Justice Reinvestment movement started in the 
US at around the turn of the new millennium with analysis identifying ‘million dollar 
blocks’: certain communities where states were spending up to a million dollars per 
block to “cycle residents back and forth from prison each year” (Cadora 2007: 11, 
Allen 2007). Early Justice Reinvestment projects explored whether some of this 
million-dollars per block might be better spent on other criminal justice or, ideally, 
broader social justice interventions, “to invest in public safety by reallocating justice 
dollars to refinance education, housing, healthcare, and jobs.” (ibid.). Latterly, argue 
Fox et al. (2013) Justice Reinvestment has tended to shed its more radical 
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aspirations to deliver social justice and instead focus more narrowly on system ‘re-
engineering’, in process losing perhaps the characteristics of a movement for social 
innovation. 
The Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot which was run by the Ministry of Justice from 
2011 to 2013 had at its heart a local financial incentives approach to reward a 
successful reduction in demand on the criminal justice system (Wong et al 2013).  It 
was piloted in six sites: Greater Manchester (an urban conurbation comprising ten 
local authorities with a combined population of 2.69 million according to the UK 
Office of National Statistics) and five individual London boroughs. The aim of the 
pilot was to reduce demand on the criminal justice. The total cost of demand at each 
site was calculated by multiplying agreed demand metrics by prices for each metric 
agreed prior to commencement of the pilot and held at the same level for both years 
(Ministry of Justice 2013c). The Justice Reinvestment pilots represent a clear 
intention to decentralise and empower local delivery agencies. However, the system 
of metrics and payment regimes established by the Ministry of Justice have been 
critiqued as overly complex and providing insufficient incentive to encourage local 
agencies to invest or to make substantial changes to practice that were not already 
being planned (Wong et al., 2013). Payments were made, amounting to several 
million pounds in the case of Manchester, but still representing a tiny proportion of 
overall criminal justice spending across Greater Manchester.  
Justice devolution has been taken forward through a number of initiatives. The 
Coalition Government introduced Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs): elected 
officials to hold police forces to account stating that: 
“PCCs bring an opportunity for collective local leadership to galvanise police, 
local authorities, the Crown Prosecution Service and courts to work together 
to prevent crime and reduce re-offending.” (Ministry of Justice 2013a: 26) 
Turnout for the elections of the first PCCs was low and the Independent Police 
Commission described them as an “experiment that is failing” arguing that it was 
“Difficult to envisage how a single individual can provide effective democratic 
 9 
governance of police forces covering large areas, diverse communities and millions 
of people” (The Independent Police Commission 2013). Nevertheless, PCCs have 
survived and more recently the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act (2016) 
has allowed for the creation of ‘metro mayors’ who are able to undertake the 
functions of Police and Crime Commissioners – a model implemented in London 
several years earlier. Local areas who create metro-mayors can also negotiate with 
central government for the devolution of a different areas of public spending  
Greater Manchester has negotiated one of the most far-reaching justice devolution 
settlements. It covers a number of areas. Those most relevant to the future of 
probation include: 
 A greater role in the commissioning of offender management services, 
alongside the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), to allow more 
local flexibility, innovation and better coordination with other local services 
including healthcare and accommodation.  
 Linking adult education and skills training provision in the community with 
education provision in prisons.  
 Explore options for regional pilots of GPS and sobriety tagging to improve 
supervision of o enders in the Greater Manchester area and to aid 
rehabilitation.  
 Greater involvement in future plans for the local courts estate, supporting 
HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) to consider alternative ways to 
make local justice more efficient and effective, for example more innovative 
use of venues and testing of problem-solving court approaches.  
The devolution agreement comes into effect in 2017 so its results are not yet known. 
One of its most intriguing elements is a commitment, set out a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Ministry of Justice and the Police and Crime 
Commissioner that: 
‘For the first time Greater Manchester will take on a greater role in the 
commissioning of offender management services, alongside the National 
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Offender Management Service (NOMS), to allow more local flexibility, 
innovation and better coordination with other local services including 
healthcare and accommodation. This will include giving Greater Manchester 
greater influence over probation and the Manchester division of the Community 
Rehabilitation Company (CRC) (emphasis added)”. (Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority 2016: 6). 
At the time of writing the full implications of this are not known but they would 
address one criticism of the original Transforming Rehabilitation policy: namely 
that contracts to run CRCs were commissioned by central government. 
 
Discussion: Do marketization and decentralisation encourage innovation? 
A common theme in the reforms described above is to create incentives for 
innovation in the delivery of offender rehabilitation services such that ‘more is 
delivered for less’.  
Innovation can take many forms. The use of payment by results in TR is a form of 
financial innovation in the funding of public services with the potential to provide 
access to new capital and to incentivize providers to develop innovative solutions to 
intractable social problems (National Audit Office 2015, Fox and Albertson 2012). It 
is too early to say whether PbR has achieved its aims in the English and Welsh 
probation sector. However, looking at the wider experience of PbR in UK public 
service reform the limited evidence available suggests caution. The National Audit 
Office (2015) having reviewed available evidence was sceptical of the potential for 
PbR to stimulate innovation: 
“[W]e found expert opinion differs on the extent to which using PbR 
promotes innovation. Government has typically used PbR to tackle 
difficult social problems that lack ready solutions – such as reducing 
reoffending. Some commissioners hope PbR will give providers the freedom 
to innovate, which might lead to new, long-term solutions to intractable 
problems. However, some providers told us that, given the risks associated 
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with it, PbR is best suited to issues to which there are known solutions and 
where the commissioner’s overarching aim is to reduce costs; they indicated 
that PbR is unlikely to encourage innovation because exploring new 
approaches is costly and increases the provider’s risk. This suggests that 
where commissioners want innovation, providers are likely to expect 
additional financial incentive.” (National Audit Office 2015: 21) 
The National Audit Office supported this statement with evidence from the major 
UK PbR schemes that they reviewed in preparing their report.  
 
Innovation can take other forms. As Fox and Grimm (2015) note, many of the 
potentially ‘game changing’ reforms in criminal justice have been, in one way or 
another ‘social innovations’. One example, widely cited in the social innovation 
literature is Restorative Justice. Social innovation is social impact driven. It has been 
described as ‘the generation and implementation of new ideas about how people 
should organise interpersonal activities or social interactions to meet one or more 
common goals’ (Mumford, 2002). Defined in this way, social innovation implies new 
sets of social relations to deliver products and services. These may include new 
partnerships across sectors (Kania and Kramer 2011), flattening of hierarchies, co-
production and personalisation (Leadbeater 2004).  
On the face of it, the Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) agenda does not seem 
particularly conducive to social innovation. Under TR innovation remained a stated 
aim of criminal justice reform but, compared to the 2010 Green Paper (Ministry of 
Justice 2010) the scope of innovation seems to have narrowed. As Fox and Marsh 
(2016) note, in the Transforming Rehabilitation Strategy there was one reference to 
giving “front-line professionals the flexibility and resources to innovate and do what 
works” (Ministry of Justice 2013b: 3) and five references to setting up the conditions 
to allow commissioned service providers to innovate. It is noticeable that these 
references all assume that innovation will come from commissioned service 
providers, not from the new National Probation Service. There were three 
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references to innovation around payment mechanisms and financing. It was 
assumed that much innovation would come from the application of technology to 
improve business processes, and this coupled with a focus on achieving outcomes, 
would drive innovation and success. (Ministry of Justice 2014a). There were no 
references to innovation involving social entrepreneurs and local communities (Fox 
and Marsh 2016). 
Key to social innovation are new processes that make use of social relations, 
implying that the natural location for the social innovation is ‘the local’, but TR saw 
the abolition of 35 Probation Trusts and the centralised commissioning of 21 CRCs 
by the Ministry of Justice/National Offender Management Service. Bowen and 
Donoghue (2013) argued that while local and community justice can enable an 
innovative and responsive local justice framework within which criminal justice 
practitioners regain discretion and are able to design more balanced, creative, and 
potentially more effective solutions, the marketization trend in TR was unlikely to 
be conducive to local and community justice. Also central to social innovation is the 
utlilisation of non-financial, social resources to achieve important social goals, but 
TR involved a payment by results model that has generally favoured large, private 
sector organisations able to make the long-term financial commitments required. 
Only one CRC is led by a consortium in which the main contractor or ‘prime’ is a not-
for-profit organisation. Social innovations often emerge bottom-up from front-line 
service delivery staff, service users or communities (Murray et al. 2010). Yet 
employee-led mutuals or staff Community Interest Companies were part of only 7 
out of 21 winning bids to run CRCs.  
However, other elements of TR seem more promising for creating an environment 
conducive to social innovation.  
 As part of its strategy to enable payment by results commissioning in the 
probation sector, the Coalition Government (Ministry of Justice, 2011) 
revised the national probation standards, significantly relaxing central 
government direction. Later, Section 15 of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 
2014 introduced the Rehabilitation Activity Requirement (RAR) for 
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Community Orders and Suspended Sentence Orders. While the court decides 
on the length of the RAR and the number of days (intensity), the CRC 
determines the most appropriate interventions to deliver, providing more 
flexibility for CRCs to innovate.  
 When the preferred bidders for CRCs were announced in 2014 the Ministry 
of Justice emphasised that 20 of the 21 CRCs would be run by partnerships 
that involved charities and other not-for-profit organisations and that around 
75 percent of the 300 subcontractors named in successful bids were 
voluntary sector or mutual organisations (Ministry of Justice 2014b). 
 Recent Justice Devolution agreements hold out the potential for local 
government and local communities to become more involved in designing 
and commissioning justice services. 
 
As the reform process develops it will be interesting to see whether different forms 
of innovation, particularly social innovations find a ‘space’ in the complex 
commissioning landscape that has been created. 
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